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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to explore a more constructive role for corporate boards — one that
would entail directors recognising the operational primacy of management and focusing their
attention on the manner in which a corporation can best fulfil its long-term strategy. Paying more
attention to nurturing long-term, sustainable value will help differentiate roles and will suggest
the need for new metrics and a deeper appreciation by directors of corporate strategy and
organisational capacity. At a time when senior management are dedicating disproportionate
resources to immediate compliance issues, it is critical that boards take such a broad view.
KEYWORDS: corporate governance, management, .organisational capacity, sustain-ability
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the fact that in today’s evolving corporate governance process actual
performance may well be retarded by the rapid proliferation of intrusive regulatory requirements,
zealous enforcement initiatives and the cottage industries that have grown up around them.
Rather than address the ‘emperor’s clothes’ phenomenon, such heightened regulatory attention to
corporate governance has driven many further away from substantive improvements, largely
because management and corporate directors have often responded by becoming more risk
averse.
The emphasis on quarterly earnings at the expense of long-term growth has garnered significant
attention in the last two decades.2 A new scholarship has arisen which has focused on the interests
of the owners of the corporation which include, depending on one’s point of view, shareholders
and other stakeholders.3 Long-term value is readily distinguished from short-term returns often
generated by managers who are incentivised by the time horizon of their compensation
arrangements. In his retrospective on the first decade of what he terms the ‘global corporate
governance revolution’,4 Stephen Davis recounts the wise comment once made by Harvard
University President Larry Summers, that ‘in the history of the world, no one has ever washed a
rented car’. As with corporations themselves, far too much of people’s savings are managed as if
rented, rather than owned. Davis observes that, ‘things go deeply amiss when owner passivity is
so chronic’.5
Although the business corporation is a relatively recent invention,6 it has coincided with and
contributed significantly to the greatest quantum leap in economic history.7 After studying the
history of human economic development, Goodfriend and MacDermott concluded that long-term
economic development involves four fundamental processes: increasing returns through
specialisation, a transition from household to market production, knowledge and human capital
accumulation, and industrialisation.8 The creation of the business corporation enhanced all four
factors. As Professor Margaret Blair points out,9 over the last two centuries the creation of the
business corporation enhanced all four factors because ‘it allowed the entrepreneurs and
managers to “lock-in” the capital invested in the enterprise, thereby making it possible to invest
in long-lived, highly specific assets’. Enterprise creation and growth were never again bounded to
the ideas of high net worth individuals nor the limited resources available to those with
administrative talent. New markets and criteria emerged for specialisation and knowledge
accumulation: entrepreneurial ideas looking for resources, resources looking for ideas and

individuals looking for jobs and proper rewards for their management talents.
Seen as a form evolving in relation to its changing environment, the corporation has been
unsurpassed in its ability to effect rapid transformations of itself without flying apart at the
seams, without disappearing as a form and often without loss of identity even at the level of the
individual firm. Not surprisingly, such a potent instrument attracts high expectations. This
precept is widely understood, but rarely acknowledged, by business leaders and their critics alike.
It is particularly relevant today, when a key building block to more effective governance may
well be moving beyond the increasingly singular focus on regulatory compliance (which often
induces short-term, risk-averse conduct) to one that embraces longer-term, sustainable value
creation.
The virtuous cycle — engaged, long-term shareholders encouraging responsive governance that
is more likely to produce higher, sustainable returns, in turn attracting more engaged, long-term
investors — remains far from commonplace. A shift in how directors think about their roles may
help remedy this disturbing trend, which undermines the fundamental strength of the enterprise
culture. The purpose of this paper is to explore a more meaningful and constructive role for
directors, focusing on governance (versus management) and the longer term.
GOVERNANCE VERSUS MANAGEMENT

More than a decade ago, John Pound distinguished between the ‘managed-corporation model’
and the ‘governed-corporation model’.10 The managed-corporation model is centred on power,
with the role of the board of directors being to tighten control over (potentially) wayward
managers. The model is a legacy of dispersed ownership and resulting agency problems. It has
become exaggerated, of late, because of regulatory responses to highly publicised corporate
scandals.
In fact (as Pound pointed out), most managers do not have excess power. Nor are most corporate
failures the result of power imbalances. They more typically result from subtle flaws in
managerial incentives and decision-making processes. While balancing powers is important, its
relevance is tied to the creation of sustainable value through effective decision making.
In the managed-corporation model, directors {and shareholders) are kept apart from strategy
formulation and policy setting. Absent poor performance or behavioural failure, the assumption is
that managers should be deferred to. In contrast, the governed-corporation model assumes a
proactive role for directors (and long-term shareholders) in the policy-making process. The goal
of reforms to advance the govemed-corporation model would be to shift the role of directors from
that of detached arbiters to part of an engaged team of decision makers. The current emphasis on
director ‘independence’ in this context may well hurt board effectiveness by encouraging
detachment rather than engagement.

As Leo Strine, Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court points out, regulatory reforms are
making it difficult for boards to include a blend of inside and outside expertise, as a range of
tasks are increasingly reserved for independent directors (exacerbated by the labelling of any
director having company affiliations as ‘non- independent’) .11 This is predicated, in part, on the
implied (and, in the authors’ view, mistaken) belief that no one can handle conflicts of interest,
nor can they be effectively regulated as a matter of corporate law or otherwise.
At the risk of overstatement, the emerging model becomes a board comprised of a single insider
— the CEO (who is deeply immersed in the corporation and has a keen interest in its immediate
future) — and a number of ‘independent’ directors selected because they have no affiliation with,
or any historical or current interest in, the corporation’s business or its future. As Strine notes,
‘that is an odd group to help develop a business strategy, and seems likely to function largely as a
monitor, with strategy being left to be decided by the CEO and her subordinates outside of the
board’s presence’.12 Warren Buffett argues that the true root of corporate scandals has been
boards of directors’ apathy and lack of engagement.13 He dismisses the argument that board
independence is a significant problem and has argued that owners, suppliers or professional
advisers can often perform more effectively as directors.
The danger is that independent directors will tend to be more risk averse. At the personal level,
they face much more downside risk than upside reward and (at least in the short term) are prone
to lack the knowledge necessary in order to make informed ‘bets’. The result is a tendency to
focus on inputs (and their personal exposure) rather than outputs (and what’s good for the
corporation and its stakeholders).
While it may offend current fashion, there is much to be argued in favour of correcting the
balance with more insiders on boards, or, at least, for thinking about knowledge as a more
important factor in board composition and dynamics than independence. Interestingly, while
family-controlled businesses have long been viewed as rife with conflicts, a recent study suggests
that a majority of them outperform and outlast their non-family controlled peers.14
DIFFERENTIATING ROLES

If corporate governance consist of managing business operations, it is arguable whether there is
an enduring role for boards of directors. A more constructive and functional approach is
suggested by the works of Elliott Jaques, who took a different tack to differentiating
responsibilities. After working for over 30 years in the UK as a management consultant, this
Canadian-born psychologist, physician and sociologist concluded that organisational hierarchies
are deeply ingrained in human nature and can be objectively measured.
The cornerstone of his theones, which resulted in more than 20 books and many journal
publications, is the concept of‘time- span of responsibility’. In simple terms, every individual has
some responsibility, some discretion, with regards to the manner in which their tasks are

executed. Sooner or later, however, they will be checked upon by a ‘superior’ (a supervisor, a
CEO, a board of directors, etc), who will determine whether they have been using the resources at
their disposal wisely. The essential question, according to Jaques, is: How long does the
individual exercise discretion without being checked by a superior? For manual workers, this
could be minutes or hours. For lower-level managers, it may go from weeks to a month; for
middle managers, from one month to one year; for top managers, several years.15 Hierarchies
become a natural way to organise around ascending layers of time-spans of responsibility.
While Jaques used this finding to inspire a number of interesting works about levels of
responsibility, evaluation and incentive systems,1 organisational culture and leadership,1' and
even a general theory for organisation, one could well apply his basic proposition to clarify roles
in corporate governance.
The starting point is Jaques’ finding that the level of responsibility in any organisational role can
be objectively measured in terms of the target completion time of the longest task assigned to that
role.19 In today’s environment, it may well be unrealistic to assign a CEO sole responsibility for
tasks that will have an impact in-20 years. Markets and institutional investors impose
considerable pressure on management to focus on shortterm performance. Likewise, senior
management — subject to ‘bounded rationality’20 — often have difficulty focusing on the longer
term due to the immediate and dynamic day-to-day pressures of issues such as political and
regulatory exigencies, customers’ demands or competitor moves.
To take an extreme example, few would argue that a series of one-year objectives can,
cumulatively, be viewed as a long-term strategy (or lead to extraordinary performance). Yet
market incentives often drive such behaviour on the part of corporate managers, whose
performance is measured on a quarterly and annual basis. Often, even firms with multi-year plans
tend to measure only the first year’s goals (which can then be reset to meet next year’s bonus
thresholds). In addition to fostering a short-term outlook, this tends to further encourage
managers (and boards) to cling to the implicit (and deeply flawed) belief in the stability of
organisations and markets — a belief that becomes a means of maintaining stability, or at any
rate, the illusion of it. As Donald Schon pointed out decades ago, ‘the more radical the prospect
of change the more vigorous the defence — the more urgent the commitment to the stable
state’.22
Managerial theorists such as Peter Senge have observed that, as in natural systems, corporations
rarely follow such a linear flow of progression. Rather, in what some have termed ‘biomimicry’,
most successful corporations follow a cycle of rapid growth (production), temporary stability
(recycling) and, when things go well, disruptive regeneration (or decline). Embracing this
continuing process of transformation makes it imperative to institutionalise a longer term focus
on ‘organisational learning’ and sustainability. As Senge observes, the major impediment to this
is the fact that most management groups want things to happen quickly, well within the
timeframes to which their personal rewards are geared.23
Considering the basic proposition of Jaques, it may be useful to think of the board of directors as

occupying the highest hierarchical position — responsible for those tasks and dimensions that
have the longest time-span of completion. It is here that boards might ‘carve out’ and clarify a
more useful role for themselves. Rather than struggle with the operational primacy of
management (assuming, of course, they have confidence in the CEO), they might shift the
emphasis of their monitoring role — to one that would focus on maximising the company’s
longer-term sustainable value.
In such a model, students of Jaques would agree that boards of directors should focus on optimal
organisational design. ‘CEOs should be accountable for developing, implementing and
maintaining superior organisational designs. Boards of Directors should be accountable for
ensuring that this happens.’24
BALANCING SHORT AND LONG-TERM FOCUS
The authors are not suggesting that the CEO gives up responsibility for either the strategic
planning process or organisational alignment. Rather, this might be a primary focus in the
interaction between the CEO and the board of directors (and directors should be expected to have
a much deeper appreciation of their company’s strategy and its elements and manner of execution
than most do currently). Indeed, it is this focus that might best define and inform many of the
other basic responsibilities of the boards of most large public corporations — CEO selection,
evaluation and ongoing succession planning, providing a ‘sounding board’ for the CEO and
drilling deeply in their review of major corporate transactions.
In a recent survey,25 a majority of corporate managers indicated they would forego investments
that offered an attractive return on capital if it meant missing quarterly earnings expectations.
Regrettably, regulatory reforms often tend to aggravate, rather than mitigate, this misperception
of what financial markets want. Hence, despite a significant increase in the time commitments
required of directors, most still do not grapple with the kind of strategic tradeoffs needed to strike
an appropriate balance between short-term performance and long-term health.
It is alarming that the most recently released McKinsey survey of corporate directors indicated
that, while more than 75 per cent wanted to spend more time on strategy and risk, more than a
quarter had, at best, a limited understanding of the current strategy of their companies.26 Only 11
per cent claimed to have a complete understanding, while only 4 per cent said that they fully
understood their company’s long-term position and more than half indicated that they had little or
no understanding of the key initiatives that their companies needed in order to secure the longterm future.
The authors recognise that the day-to-day activities of the board go beyond these topics. Their
concern, however, is that the increasing focus on operational oversight tends to deflect attention
from the more fundamental issues on which good directors can and should be expected to ‘add
value’ and, all too often, leads to either superficial oversight or micromanagement.
By differentiating and focusing roles more clearly, there would be a stronger sense of purpose

and responsibility for directors and CEOs alike (and less risk of co-option or the dependence of
directors). It might facilitate the sort of ‘constructive tension’ between boards and management
that many espouse but (until there is a crisis) far fewer achieve. Most importantly, it would
provide a constructive counterpoint to the pressures imposed on management to meet immediate
challenges.
Nor are the authors suggesting that the board should forsake its responsibility to monitor
management performance and operations. Rather, such a differentiation might encourage a more
constructive balance, carving out a proactive (versus compliance- oriented) role for the board,
while recognising the operational primacy of management and encouraging directors to dedicate
their primary attention to evaluating the manner in which the company can best fulfil its longterm strategy.
BUILDING ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY
To be fair, regulatory reforms and perceived market pressures (and related compensation
frameworks) are not the only reasons for management tending to be overly focused on the short
term. Leaving aside such factors, it is challenging to manage multiple time horizons — to build
the resilience and organisational capacity not only to deliver in the short term, but also to sustain
performance. Here, again, a reflective board, prepared to take informed risks and focused on the
long-term success of the enterprise, should be able to contribute value.
One of the problems with the self- correcting power of the corporate law system, is that it
demands a great deal of self-conscious and intelligent moral reflection from busy, harassed
people who have little time to give it and not much training in how to. Richard Neilsen
characterised this problem, in part, as one of ‘managerial isolation’ and advocated that managers
at all levels in an organisation should habitually think about the enterprise’s legitimate values in
the context of what it is doing or planning.27
Such organisational capacity is the key to managing in an uncertain world. Achieving a high
‘learn to bum ratio’ within an organisation increases the odds of success and lets a firm ‘fall
forward’ rather than backward in response to the unanticipated challenges and setbacks that
inevitably arise.28 Again, Jaques’ theones of organisational design are instructive, as are others.
McKinsey, for example, suggests a number of key antidotes.29 First, it is argued that a company’s
strategy should consist of a portfolio of initiatives that consciously embrace different time
horizons. Some initiatives will influence short-term performance, while others will create options
for the future. Secondly, companies need to identify a small number of key metrics to support a
focus on both performance and health. Finally, companies need to change the nature of their
dialogue with key stakeholders, particularly investors and employees to promote that ‘virtuous
cycle’ identified at the outset of this paper. There is little point, for example, in discussing the
company’s long-term health with arbitrageurs or most hedge fund managers. These are all
measures that fall within the remit of an engaged board of directors.

FOCUS ON VALUE SUSTAINABILITY
Once boards decide to shift their focus to maximising long-term sustainable value, they can then
address how they want to structure and inform themselves to do their job better. To be effective,
such a role will require boards to delve beneath the surface of corporate performance.
As a starting point, boards should eschew the US trend towards over-reliance on lengthy,
detailed, highly prescriptive accounting rules. In addition to such generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) financial statements, they should be receiving information (and hopefully, in
turn, overseeing reporting to shareholders) in a manner that provides multiple perspective
reporting as to how the relevant business is conceptualised, managed and performing.
This process should involve producing additional financial and non-financial reporting reflecting
the various perspectives needed to create a meaningful picture of economic performance. As
Litan and Wallison31 argue, GAAP have serious shortcomings in reflecting the factors that
determine the value of companies with newer business models as opposed to those used 30 years
ago. For example, market to book ratio was, on average, very close to 1 until the early 1980s.
Hence investors could feel comfortable that accounting figures had a reasonable association to
the true value of their investment. On the other hand, current valuation models take into account
intangible assets associated with factors such as brands, customer base, workforce, innovation
and marketing effectiveness.
Financial results tend to be lagging performance indicators, whereas factors such as customer
satisfaction, product or service quality, relationships with outside stakeholders, innovation and
employee commitment are leading indicators of sustainable performance. As noted above, this
challenges directors to turn their attention to non- GAAP and non-financial indicators, which tend
to be harder to measure and less reliable (and, accordingly, ignored if not actively discouraged by
financial markets, regulators and liability regimes). Determining ways to rigorously monitor such
performance measures will suggest new roles and duties for independent advisers, as well as
boards of directors. It is encouraging to see the growing adoption of management control tools
such as the Balanced Scorecard. This instrument, created in the early 1990s by Robert Kaplan
and David Norton, was meant to provide a ‘balanced’ set of measures that complements the
financial indicators ‘with operational measures on customer satisfaction, internal processes, and
the organization’s innovation and improvement activities . . . that are the drivers of future
financial performance’.32 More recently the same authors linked the balanced scorecard
framework with strategy planning, making it an even more powerful tool for boards and top
managers to use to monitor risk and strategic execution.
Another issue that flows from such a focus is ongoing succession planning — a vital aspect of
monitoring management performance and operations in order to evaluate the manner in which the
company is fulfilling its long-term strategy and its capacity to continue to do so. Likewise, with
respect to the review of transactions that could fundamentally change the company’s trajectory.
A recent Booz Allen Hamilton survey found that more shareholder value was wiped out in the

five-year period from 1999 to 2003 as a result of mismanagement and poor execution of strategy
than was lost through all the recent compliance scandals combined. While a necessary instrument
for risk management, few successful businesses have been built through controls. It is intuitively
obvious to anyone who understands the culture of enterprise that too much focus on compliance
can overwhelm the keys to corporate success — good strategy and empowered people who can
execute it.
This differentiation of roles and focus may be particularly timely in today’s ‘zero tolerance’
regulatory environment. At a time when senior managers are spending disproportionate resources
focusing on immediate (if not retroactive) and often overwhelming issues of regulatory compliance, it is critical that boards take a broader view to ensure that policies and processes are put
in place to make the right kind of decisions, build the right kind of culture and attract the right
kind of people over time. Succumbing to overly risk-averse conduct — which may be expedient
in the short term when CEOs fear the ‘criminalisation of mistakes’ — will needlessly impose
longer-term costs at both the firm and market levels.
CONCLUSION
Never has the corporation been so challenged as a form of enterprise. For generations, it has been
the primary vehicle for the diffusion of innovation and, therefore, in a major sense, a vital agent
of social learning for society at large.

Whether the corporation will continue to be the central instrument in such a construct may well
depend on the ability to ensure a steady hand on the tiller, focusing beyond the vagaries of
today’s reactionary environment, to ensure the corporation’s continuing vitality as a powerful and
self-regenerating mode of mobilising capital and enterprise.
The ability of the system to self-correct, over time embracing a more balanced approach to
nurturing the long-term performance of corporations and promoting ‘systems thinking’ tools that
have been available for some time, should be influenced by the success in clarifying the
interlocking roles of boards and corporate management. The key is to ensure that such tools are
neither applied mechanically nor squeezed out by pressures for short-term or narrow complianceoriented perspectives.
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